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before, during and after the commission of a murder until the actual
trial, including anything which is debatably of a criminal nature. It is
also worth noting that Strickler challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence in the aggregate and not the relevance of the arguably non-
violent acts.
Bill of Particulars
The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the circuit court's denial of
Strickler's motion for a bill of particulars. The bill asked:
A. To identify the grounds, and all of them, on which [the Common-
wealth] contends that defendant is guilty of capital murder under
Virginia Code Sect. 18.2-31, as amended, 1950.
B. To identify the evidence, and all of it, upon which it intends to rely
in seeking a conviction of defendant upon the charge of capital
murder.
D. To identify the evidence, and all of it, on which it intends to rely
in support of the aggravating factors identified, and all other evidence
which it intends to introduce in support of its contention that death is
the appropriate punishment for this defendant.
241 Va. at 490. The court stated that the motion was properly denied
because:
[t]o be sufficient, an indictment must give the accused
"notice of the nature and character of the offense charged so
he can make his defense." When an indictment meets that
standard, as the indictments here do, a bill of particulars is
not required.
Id. (quoting Wilder v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 145, 147, 225 S.E.2d
411, 413 (1976))(citing Ward v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 564, 569,
138 S.E.2d 293, 296-97 (1964); Tasker v. Commonwealth, 202 Va.
1019,1024,121 S.E.2d 459,462,463 (1961)). The court also held that
anything sought by the petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars
above and beyond the "'notice of the nature and character of the
offense charged"' was a discovery request which must be made
pursuant to the rules of the court. Id. See generally case summary of
Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
It is important to note that part (C) of Strickler's motion for a bill
of particulars was granted by the circuit court. This is significant
because the indictment did not give the "nature and character" of the
aggravating factors that the commonwealth sought to prove and part
(C) only asked the commonwealth to identify the aggravating factors.
This motion should be granted so that the defendant can receive his
due process right to be heard and to present evidence which will allow
him to defend against evidence of aggravating factors. Defense
counsel may contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse for a
new model bill of particulars and supporting memorandum. Finally,
is arguable that merely asking the commonwealth to identify the type
of evidence it will seek to introduce is not the same as discovery. In
addition, in light of the courts' willingness to allow a variety of
conduct to prove future dangerousness, motions in limine on future
dangerousness should be considered to exclude evidence which is not
probative of defendant's propensity to commit acts of violence in the
future.
Summary and analysis by:
Marcus E. Garcia
QUESINBERRY v. COMMONWEALTH
241 Va. 364,402 S.E.2d 218 (1991)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
A Virginia jury convicted George Adrian Quesinberry of capital
murder in the commission of a robbery. Virginia Code § 18.2-31 (d) (now
4). Quesinberry and two friends were in the process of robbing an office
building when they were interrupted by the owner, Thomas L. Haynes.
Quesinberry shot Haynes twice in the back as the store owner attempted
to flee. As the three thieves were leaving, Haynes tried to push himself up.
Quesinberry hit him in the head at least twice with his pistol, and Haynes
died later that morning.
Quesinberry filed a pre-trial motion for a bill of particulars request-
ing that the court direct the Commonwealth to identify: (1) the grounds,
and all of them, on which the Commonwealth contended that the defen-
dant was guilty of capital murder, (2) the evidence, and all of it, upon
which the Commonwealth intended to rely in seeking a conviction of the
defendant upon the charge of capital murder, (3) the aggravating factors,
if any, upon which the Commonwealth intended to rely in seeking the
death penalty, should the defendant be convicted of capital murder; and
(4) the evidence, and all of it, on which the Commonwealth intended to
rely in support of the aggravating factors identified, and all other evidence
which the Commonwealth intended to introduce in support of its conten-
tion that death was the appropriate punishment for this defendant. The trial
court granted the motion with respect to sections (1) and (3), but denied
the motion with respect to sections (2) and (4). Quesinberry v. Common-
wealth, 241 Va. 364,372,402 S.E.2d 218,223 (1991).
During the penalty stage, Quesinberry's attorney objected to the
introduction of evidence that the defendant possessed a stolen gun and that
the defendant was auser of marijuana and cocaine. The court admitted the
evidence over defendant's objection. Id. at 380, 402 S.E.2d 227. In
contrast, the court refused to instruct the jury that alife sentence meant that
Quesinberry would be ineligible for parole for thirty years. Id. at 371,402
S.E.2d 223. After hearing the instructions, the jury retired to deliberate
and fix punishment. The jury returned and requested definitions of several
words appearing in the instructions: "culpable," "moral turpitude," "quan-
titatively," and "qualitatively." The court gave definitions without
objection from counsel. Id. at 380,402 S.E.2d 228. Immediately after the
jury left the courtroom to resume deliberation, Quesinberry's attorney
objected to the definitions given by the court. The court overruled the
objection as untimely. The jury fixed Quesinberry's punishment at death.
Quesinberry appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court, claiming, inter
alia, that the trial court erred in not ordering a bill of particulars in
accordance with paragraphs (2) and (4) of his motion; that the court erred
in admitting evidence that he had possessed stolen property and used
marijuana and cocaine; that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury
as to the practical consequences of a life sentence; and that the trial court
erred in its definitions of the terms for which the jury sought clarification.
HOLDING
Quesinberry assigned numerous errors. Some of these the court
treated in a conclusory fashion. Others did not involve death penalty law
or are unlikely to arise often because they revolved around facts peculiar
to the case. These issues, which will not be discussed in this summary,
include: the constitutionality of the death penalty; the constitutionality of
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Virginia's statutory capital murder framework; the denial of defendant's
request for additional peremptory challenges; the sufficiency of proof that
the robbery predicate for capital murder had been established; the suffi-
ciency of a post-verdict instruction regarding the defendant's failure to
testify; the permissiblity of allowing the jury to view the crime scene; the
admissibility of photographs of the victim's wounds and a photograph of
the victim taken during the autopsy; and the proportionality of the death
sentence with other Virginia cases.
The issues meriting discussion are included in the remainder of this
summary. The court ruled that a defendant is not entitled to a bill of
particulars as a matter ofright. In so holding, the court relied upon Virginia
Code § 19.2-230, which states, "a court of record may direct the filing of
a bill of particulars at any time before trial." Id. at 372, 402 S.E.2d 223
(emphasis in original). Thus, the decision to grant or deny a motion for a
bill of particulars is within the discretion of the trial court.
The court also held that evidence indicating that the weapon used by
the defendant had been stolen was properly admitted. The court ex-
plained, in a conclusory fashion, that such evidence was relevant to show
Quesinberry's "propensity to arm himself with a weapon." Id. at 380,402
S.E.2d 227. Similarly, the court ruled that evidence of Quesinberry's drug
use was relevant as indicative of his "future dangerousness." Id. Con-
versely, the court held that a defendant is not entitled to inform a jury as
to the practical effects of a life sentence in a capital case. Id. at 371,402
S.E.2d 223.
Finally, the court concluded that some claims were defaulted be-
cause defense counsel failed to argue them on brief. Id. at 370,402 S.E.2d
222. The court also held defaulted Quesinberry's claim regarding the
court's definitions of terms in the jury instructions, given pursuant the
request of the jury. Id. at 380, 402 S.E.2d 228. The court based its ruling
on defense counsel's failure to make a timely objection. Id.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
A. Bill of Particulars
The most important aspect of the court's decision on defense
counsel's motion for abill of particulars is that the trial court did grant two
of counsel's requests. Regardless of whether a defendant is entitled to a
bill of particulars as a matter of right, it should be requested, especially
since an indictment gives no notice of the aggravating factors upon which
the Commonwealth intends to rely. The Virginia Capital Case Clearing-
house has prepared a new model motion for a bill of particulars with a
supporting memorandum. Where the prosecution intends to prove the
"vileness" factor under Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4C, the new
motion requests that the prosecution identify each narrowing construction
upon which it intends to offerevidence. See Lago,Litigating the "Vileness"
Factor in Virginia, Capital Defense Digest, this issue. Copies of the
motion and supporting memorandum are available through the Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse.
A motion requesting the court to direct the filing of a bill of
particulars is especially important in light of the United States Supreme
Court's recent decisions inLankford v. Idaho, 111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991), and
Shell v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 313 (1990). In Lankford, the Court
emphasized the importance of giving notice to the defendant, enabling the
adversary process to function at a capital penalty trial. Lankford, 111 S. CL
at 1732-33. See case summary of Lankford, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue. In Shell, the Court struck Mississippi's limiting construction of its
"vileness" factor because the construction did not provide adequate
guidance to the sentencer. Shell, 111 S. Ct. at 313. See case summary of
Shell, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 3 (1991). A bill of
particulars is designed to give the defendantnotice of the issues which will
be important in the trial, including the penalty phase issues which are
unique to a capital case.
Although under most circumstances the decision to grant or deny a
motion for a bill of particulars is within the court's discretion, there are
some situations where the court must grant at least part of the motion.
Virginia Code section 19.2-399 requires the defense to raise certain
issues pretrial, including an attempt to dismiss the charge or charging
document on the ground that the statute upon which it is based is
unconstitutional. Section 19.2-399 also requires the court and Common-
wealth to aid the defense in making these motions in a timely fashion.
When the defense has filed a motion for a bill of particulars relating to a
section 19.2-399 motion, the trial court "shall ... direct the Common-
wealth to file a bill of particulars .... (emphasis added). A Shell attack
on the charging document, claiming inadequate guidance in Virginia's
narrowing construction of the "vileness" factor, must be made pretrial.
Such an attack is directed toward the unconstitutional application of the
Virginia statute. Thus, section 19.2-399 arguably requires the court to
direct the Commonwealth to file a bill of particulars for any narrowing
construction of the "vileness" factor upon which it intends to rely in
seeking the death penalty.
B. Evidence of Aggravating Factors
It is difficult to understand the court's reasoning in allowing evidence
of Quesinberry's possession of a stolen weapon as relevant to an aggra-
vating factor in support of imposing the death penalty. Quesinberry was
convicted for capital murder under Virginia Code Section 18.2-31 (d). In
order to convict Quesinberry under 18.2-31 (d), the Commonwealth was
required to show that he killed the victim with premeditation in the
commission of a robbery or attempted robbery while armed with a
dangerous weapon. Possession of a weapon is an element of the crime
itself, and defendant's possession alone, therefore, cannot be used as an
aggravating factor in the penalty phase. The only additional information
which might be used as an aggravator is the fact that the weapon was
stolen. However, the court's explanation of the relevancy of the evidence
is that it shows the defendant's "propensity to arm himself." Quesinberry
at 380, 402 S.E.2d 227. The fact that a weapon happens to be stolen could
hardly make the possessor more likely to be armed in the future. This
illogical conclusion reveals just how far the court is willing to go in
allowing evidence as probative of future dangerousness.
The court's ruling in allowing evidence of defendant's drug use is
similarly confusing. Virginia Code Section 19.2-264.4 enumerates, but
does not limit, the mitigating factors which the defendant may introduce.
Among those mitigating factors is the defendant's impaired capacity "to
appreciate the criminality of his [or her] conduct or to conform his [or her]
conduct to the requirements of law," a not unlikely result of drug use. In
Quesinberry, the court has allowed the Commonwealth to introduce as an
aggravating factor, evidence which arguably mitigates the crime under the
statute.
There is a paradox in weighing aggravating factors with mitigating
factors. The jury is asked to balance all mitigating factors, including those
enumerated in statute (i.e., the defendant's impaired capacity), with the
statutory aggravators (i.e., the defendant's future dangerousness). Certain
facts are likely to fit into both categories. As apractical matter, a person's
impaired capacity at the time of a particular offense may or may not be
likely to render that person more dangerous in the future. However, the
Virginia legislature's specific inclusion of that factor as a mitigator should
implicitly exclude it from the broad group of aggravating factors. Im-
paired capacity is a factor which mitigates the penalty under statute. The
practical paradox that some facts both mitigate and aggravate should be
recognized by counsel. The legal paradox should not continue. A
reasonable interpretation of legislative intent is that reviewing courts
should not consider mitigation as aggravation.
Although the Supreme Courthas held that ajury in acapital casemust
be allowed to consider any evidence in mitigation, regardless of the
factors enumerated in statute, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), there
has been no such ruling for aggravating factors. Thus, traditional laws of
relevancy should apply to the prosecution's introduction of evidence in
support of the death penalty. The two factors which are statutorily relevant
to the imposition of capital punishment are: (1) "that [the defendant]
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
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serious threat to society," and (2) "that [the defendant's] conduct in
committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravatedbattery to
the victim." Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4C(1990). Thelaw ofrelevancy limits
the prosecution to introducing only evidence which would tend to make more
likely that one of those two statutory factors exist. The court summarily
concluded that the fact that Quesinberry's weapon was stolen is admissible to
show his propensity to be armed. Likewise, the court concluded that the
existence of a factor which mitigates the crime under statute is admissible in
support of the death penalty.
Where evidence of questionable relevancy is known to exist, attor-
neys should seek to exclude the evidence pretrial by motions in limine and
objections. The courts seem to be more willing to admit questionable
evidence at the penalty phase, and the appellate courts are hesitant to find
error when viewing the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole. A pretrial
ruling on the relevancy of an item may receive more favorable treatment,
at trial or on appeal.
C. Refusal to Allow Parole Ineligibility Information
The court also refused to allow evidence that a life sentence would
mean ineligibility for parole for at least 30 years. The duration of the
defendant's stay in prison under a life sentence is almost certainly relevant
to counter an argument of the defendant's "future dangerousness" under
Virginia Code Section 19.2-264AC. Additionally, the court's ruling
deprives the defendant of the right under Lockett to present any evidence
which could mitigate the penalty. Many jurors may hold the mistaken
view that a life sentence would allow release in ten or fewer years. See
Paduano & Stafford Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Con-
cerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 Colum. Hum.
Rts. L. Rev. 211, 221-22 & nn. 30-34 (1987). As a result, the temptation
exists to impose the stricter penalty (in this scenario, death) simply
because the alternative is considered too lenient. The information about
the actual meaning of a life sentence can clear up this misconception and
make ajuror more likely to impose a life sentence. In fact, ajury has been
known to specifically request parole eligibility information, indicating
that jurors do come to the trial with preconceived notions of what the
practical effects of a life sentence might actually be. Eaton v. Common-
wealth, 240 Va. 236,397 S.E.2d 385 (1990). See case summary of Eaton,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 2 2 (1990).
Clearly, the Virginia Supreme Court feels that a defendant is not
entitled to clear up misconceptions of the true meaning of a life sentence.
Eaton, 240 Va. at 248-49, 397 S.E.2d at 392-93; Quesinberry, 241 Va. at
371,402 S.E.2d at 223. However, the Virginia Supreme Court is not the
final arbiter of federal constitutional law. Federal courts have yet to
determine this issue. As a result, attorneys should continue to request an
instruction regarding the practical effects of a life sentence and assign the
denial as error for federal review.
D. Procedural Default
Quesinberry also illustrates the ease with which defense counsel can
default or waive an issue and prevent it from ever receiving appellate review.
In order to preserve an issue for review, counsel must timely object at trial,
Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:25, assign the ruling as error, Virginia
Supreme Court Rule 5:27, and argue the issue on brief, Virginia Supreme
Court Rule 5:17. See Powley, Perfecting the Record of a Capital Case in
Virginia,CapitalDefenseDigest,Vol.3,No. l,p.26(1990). Thecourt'snrling
in Quesinberry reveals just how strictly these rules are applied. Counsel
objected to the court's definitions of several terms only seconds after the
definitions were given. The objection came immediately after the jury retired
to the jury room, perhaps so that the issue could be argued outside the jury's
presence. On appeal, the court held that counsel's argument on the issue was
procedurally barred because the objection at trial was untimely. Quesinberry
at228. Inaddition,thecourtdeclinedtorevievfoursubstantiveissuesbecause,
although properly preserved at trial and assigned as error, the issues were not
argued on brief. Id. at 222.
Attorneys should make sure that every possible issue for appellate
review is properly preserved, assigned as error, and argued on brief. This
is especially true considering that federal courts will refuse to hear issues
which are procedurally barred under state law. See case summaries of
Coleman v. Thompson, Capital Defense Digest, this issue, and McClesky
v.Zant, Capital Defense Digest, this issue. If page limitations on appellate
briefs prevent a thorough discussion on the issues, attorneys should
reqtiest an extension. Where the page extension request is denied, that
denial in itself should be assigned as error, briefed, and properly preserved
for review. See case summary of Stockton v. Commonwealth, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
Summary and analysis by:
G. Douglas Kilday
LITIGATING THE "VILENESS" FACTOR IN VIRGINIA
BY: VICTOR A. LAGO
INTRODUCTION
This article discusses the constitutionality of the "vileness" aggra-
vating factor of the Virginia death penalty sentencing scheme, and
suggests that the judicial application of the "vileness" factor is constitu-
tionally infirm in two respects. First, the "vileness" factor on its face is too
vague to provide meaningful guidance to the sentencer as provided by the
eighth amendment.' Second, the Virginia courts' systematic failure in
providing capital defendants with proper notice of the narrowing con-
structions which they intend to apply denies capital defendants due
process as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. A defense attorney
can litigate pretrial for the proper application of the "vileness" factor to
generate valid claims for appeal and to insure that the Virginia courts and
the Commonwealth apply the factor in a constitutional manner.
THE VIRGINIA "VILENESS" FACTOR
IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
In the landmark United States Supreme Court case, Furman v.
Georgia, the Court held that states could not impose the death penalty
under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that punish-
ment could be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 2 The Court
required that capital sentencing schemes provide a meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which a death penalty is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not.3
Following Furman, state legislatures attempted to formulate death
penalty statutes which guided sentencing discretion by permitting a death
sentence only on a finding of certain aggravating factors which made the
offender more culpable than others that committed similar crimes. In
fashioning these aggravating factors many states found guidance in the
Model Penal Code, which provided a template of aggravating factors. 4
